The Nineteenth Corbishley
Memorial Lecture - 1995
The Management of Intractable
Conflicts
by Thorvald Stoltenberg
FOREWORD-By the Chairman of the Wyndham Place Trust, George Wedell
The conflict in Bosnia Hercegovina appears to be of a kind which defies logical analysis. It was therefore not easy for the Wyndham Place trustees whose concern is to promote among men and women of religious faith the concern for peace, world order and the rule of law, to find a point of contact. We were, nonetheless, anxious not to evade engagement with this most intractable of situations, particularly since Bosnia is a country in which the present difficulties can be traced back fairly directly to historical religious conflicts. The conflict between the Eastern and the Western Churches goes back to 1054, the conflict between Christians and Muslims goes back to the 15th century. It is an area in which men and women of religious faith have, over the centuries, allowed their faiths to get in the way of peace and the rule of law.
We therefore asked Mr Thorvald Stoltenberg, the co-chairman of the steering committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia and former Foreign Minister of Norway, to take as the subject of this 19th Corbishley Memorial lecture "The Management of intractable Conflicts". Mr Stoltenberg undertook to speak on this subject. Those who attended his lecture were much helped to understand the nature of the conflict by the profound knowledge of the issues as well as the empathy which Mr Stoltenberg has brought to his unenviable task. Mr Stoltenberg, in particular, analysed the role of the United Nations in this thankless situation. He demonstrated that, with all its faults, the United Nations is an essential instrument for the maintenance of peace and the rule of law. This is a particularly important element in his lecture at a time when a political prejudice against international organisations is gaining ground.
The Wyndham Place Trust hopes that the publication of this lecture will lead to a better understanding on the part of our fellow citizens of the need to develop the world’s capability for dealing with intractable conflicts, if necessary on a long term basis. It is essential that all of us should have the political will to urge governments to support the United Nations in moral, practical and financial ways.
THE MANAGEMENT OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS
I am very grateful for your kind invitation. It is an honour to be asked to deliver the Thomas Corbishley Memorial Lecture. During the almost two decades which have passed since the death of Thomas Corbishley tremendous progress has been made in the construction of European cooperation. But so much remains to be done. The construction of Europe is first and foremost about peace, stability, justice and prosperity - about allowing us to live in tolerance and respect of one another. We must always keep this wider perspective in mind. If we lose it we will also lose our sense of direction and our motivation.
You have asked me to speak about the management of intractable conflicts, using the war in the former Yugoslavia as example. It is no easy task, even after more than two years of intimate involvement with the conflict. In spite of the tremendous efforts of the international community to stop the conflict, the dangers of escalation and more wars are very real. The longer the conflict continues, the more international observers and participants seem perplexed about its complexities.
Every conflict has its own characteristics. its own history and its own setting. Nevertheless, it is - I believe - possible to draw some conclusions and lessons of a more general nature and I shall try to do so in the course of my introduction. As the conflict unfolds it has become increasingly difficult to do so without being controversial. That is not an ideal situation to be in for a mediator. But I shall try to give you my views as frankly as I possibly can.
But before I do that, allow me to express my profound admiration for the efforts that your country, the UK, has made in the former Yugoslavia. You are one of the largest contributors of humanitarian assistance; you are one of the largest contributors of peacekeeping forces; and you have provided some of the most outstanding and dedicated people in leading positions - such as Lord Carrington and Lord Owen as EU mediators and Generals Rose and Smith as commanders in Bosnia. I have had the privilege of working with Lord Owen as Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) for more than two years. We have shared more problems and more frustrations than any of us has ever experienced before and will, I hope, ever experience again. But we have also experienced a partnership which has been unique and very rewarding for me.
It has become commonplace to ask: how can it all happen in Europe - in what we thought was the most advanced of all continents? We have become used to sending our own European peacekeepers to various parts of the world - to Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. Today, there are thousands of peacekeepers from different parts of the world on European soil. We must not simply shrug it off by saying that the Balkans has always been an unstable corner of Europe. Some of the worst atrocities of this century have taken place in Europe. We have made tremendous progress in forging new ties between old enemies. And we have demonstrated that it can be done - we can cooperate in partnership where turbulence and hostility used to be the rule rather than the exception. But we are far from being at the end of the road. The protection of human rights and dignity is not only something which applies to distant places. We must remain vigilant also on our own continent. The cooperation we have created in Europe must be gradually deepened and widened.
After having spent three years in Yugoslavia in the early 1960s, I have often wondered how could it all happen? History provides part of the answer. We are all prisoners of our history at least to some extent. And in the former Yugoslavia almost every individual you meet has a personal story to tell - of suffering and conflict for decades or even centuries. It is an area where conflicts have frequently been "solved" by war. But it is also an area where so many can tell stories of how they lived together, married across national or ethnic lines and often did not even know - or care to know - the national or ethnic origin of friends, neighbours and colleagues.
When Tito died we all asked the crucial question: what now? Nothing happened - for a while at least -until the communist system started collapsing from Warsaw to Bucharest and finally in Moscow: until the nations of Central and Eastern Europe again insisted on their own true independence; until they again started searching for their own identity. Gradually, Tito’s instruments of domination - the party and the army - started losing their grip on power and their credibility. The urge to reassert national and cultural identities re-emerged.
It is indeed a tragedy to experience how quickly all the suffering and all the conflicts of the past have again been brought to life and how quickly all the experience of living together has been pushed aside. However I still experience so often the quiet yearning of ordinary citizens simply to get on with their lives in respect of one another. But the longer the conflict continues the more new suffering is added and the more hatred is fanned.
I will not try to minimise the difficulties and complexities in bringing peace to the region or the suffering experienced by so many. Nevertheless, some important achievements are often overlooked.
First of all, when the conflict started it was one of our main concerns to contain it; to prevent it from spreading beyond the borders of Bosnia and Croatia. There has always been the danger that it could develop into a wider Balkan war - to Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and even beyond the former Yugoslavia. The danger still exists, although there is greater hope of containing it than when the conflict started. There are several reasons; the main European powers have not, as in the past, come down on different sides in the conflict but have pursued to a large extent a European policy formulated within the framework of the European Union. Furthermore, the dramatic changes in east-west relations have made it possible for Western Europe to formulate its policies in close consultation not only with the United States, but also with Russia. And finally, on the recommendation of the ICFY Co-Chairmen, the United Nations Security Council agreed to the early deployment of a preventive UN force to the FYROM. That was indeed a novelty in the history of the United Nations. And it has, I am convinced, provided an important contribution to preventing the spreading of the conflict.
Should a pull out of UN forces from Bosnia Herzegovina and from Croatia occur - contrary to what I hope - then the prevention of a spreading of the conflict to other areas - politically and militarily - would need to be an essential part of a post pull out strategy.
Secondly, the United Nations has helped to contain the intensity of the war inside the area of the present conflict. I am thinking of the establishment of the "No Fly Zone" over Bosnia and of the arms embargo. The first has prevented the parties from using aircraft. Had this resolution not been passed and effectively implemented it could have led to more military and civilian casualties.
The arms embargo is often criticised. I remain convinced, however, that lifting the arms embargo would bring new and more destructive weapons into the area and an intensification and escalation of the conflict.
And we should not believe that only one side would acquire new weapons if the arms embargo were to be lifted. Such a step would lead to a total collapse of the arms embargo. There would always be those who are ready to provide weapons to the different sides. The result would be more than increased destruction and suffering. It could also deal a serious blow to the efforts of keeping the major powers together on the main lines of their policies and it could gradually bring them indirectly into the conflict on one side or the other. That would indeed be a serious setback not only to our efforts at reducing the suffering of the people, but also to our efforts to achieve a negotiated solution.
Thirdly, the Federation established last year between the Bosnian governments and the Bosnian Croats ended a fierce and bitter struggle and brought peace to a large number of people inside Bosnia. Tension still exists. But when I visited Mostar three weeks ago I was impressed to see the efforts now being made to facilitate reconciliation and reconstruction.
Fourthly, from 29 March 1994 to 1 May 1995 there was practically no fighting in Croatia, due to the ceasefire agreement signed last year. This was no minor achievement. Unfortunately, in May this year the ceasefire agreement was massively violated, particularly in Western Slavonia, and is under serious pressure also along other parts of the lines of separation. But it has - so far, I underline -prevented the resumption of fullscale war.
Fifthly, international relief and assistance has helped the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina to go through the winters of 1992/93, 1993/94 and 1994/95. Even as we are assembled here today the United Nations is in fact providing assistance to over three million refugees and displaced persons daily.
Sixthly, the United Nations has helped in the maintenance of some measure of stability. So often I experience the fear of people that withdrawal would lead to a dramatic worsening of their situation.
So, there have been important achievements. But I readily admit - this is certainly not the time to be complacent or self-congratulatory. Not only have we so far not achieved an overall peace. The harsh reality is that the danger of a serious escalation of the war in Bosnia is still great. And there is a serious danger of a new war in Croatia.
The situation in Bosnia is deeply worrying. The exclusion zone around Sarajevo is not respected. The monitoring of weapons collection sites has been difficult. Humanitarian assistance trickles in, creating a desperate situation for those depending on food and medicine from the international community. Intense efforts are being made to cease the hostilities and bring the parties back to the negotiating table - so far without success. Today, we face the distinct prospect of heading towards more war and not towards more peace.
The tragic fact is that no direct negotiations between all the parties have taken place for 17 months. Until February 1994 regular meetings -almost monthly - took place in Geneva under the auspices of ICFY. Since then the negotiating process has - for all practical purposes - stalled. The primary responsibility for a negotiated peace Ties with the parties. We - the international community and mediators - can only assist the parties when they so wish. Five peace plans have been put forward: the Carrington cutileiro Plan in 1992 the Vance-Owen Plan in May 1993, the plan negotiated by Lord Owen and myself in September 1993, the EU Action Plan of December 1993 and finally the Contact Group Plan.
If we are to draw lessons from our own experience -and we should - then I believe that one important lesson must be this: that we must avoid putting ourselves in a situation where the negotiating process stops and no real dialogue exists.
Some do argue that we should show more muscle, use more force to convince the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate and accept the Contact Group plan. The UN forces have a mandate to use force whenever necessary to defend themselves. But they do not have a mandate to try to impose a solution with military means. It is not a war-fighting force. And it is not equipped or organised to be a combatant force. Nor would many troop-contributing countries accept to keep their forces in Bosnia if the mandate were amended to allow for use of force beyond the requirements of self-defence. It is a difficult task -to be a peacekeeping force in an area where peace does not exist. But the peacekeepers will only be able to perform their functions as long as they are not seen by any of the parties as having taken sides in the conflict. The recent deployment of a Rapid Reaction Force, consisting of British, French and Dutch forces better equipped than those already in the area, is a positive step. It will allow a more effective implementation of the mandate and more vigorous self-defence when needed. But there are pitfalls: we may well experience attempts to draw this force into a combatant role - precisely because of its better equipment.
We must never forget that the key to the success of any peacekeeping force lies in the consent and cooperation of the parties. And this consent and cooperation of the parties again depends on whether or not the peacekeeping force is perceived as carrying out its functions in an impartial way. The UN is not at war with, or at war on behalf of, any of the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina or in Croatia. If any country should consider adopting a war-fighting role then first their own people and parliament will have to be convinced that it is right to do so.
You cannot be partially impartial, but impartiality does not mean inaction or moral equivalence. The UN is, of course, not impartial to massacres or hostages taking.
The basic pillars of peace-keeping: impartiality, consent and cooperation of the parties become particularly difficult in a situation where peace does not exist. Allow me to illustrate this crucial point.
In, 1992 agreement was reached to open Sarajevo airport. UN forces were deployed to ensure its security, supervise its operations and facilitate the unloading of humanitarian cargo. The UNHCR then organised what has been the longest lasting airlift in aviation history. It has always been touch and go, with numerous interruptions and closures of the airport. Nevertheless, more than 150,000 metric tons of humanitarian aid have been brought to the citizens of Sarajevo by air. Earlier this year, however, the situation deteriorated sharply until UNPROFOR could no longer ensure the continuation of the airlift. There was frequent firing at aircraft, particularly by the Bosnian Serbs who also refused to guarantee the safety of aircraft landing at the airport. In this situation, with the airport and the planes within range of mortars and heavy machine guns which could be easily concealed and quickly removed, UNPROFOR could only ensure safety by deploying large numbers of ground troops with a mandate to use force against elements bombarding the airport. But the number of troops was not available. And UNPROFOR did not have the mandate to use such force. The only practical means of keeping the airport functioning remains to obtain the consent and cooperation of the parties.
The same dilemma applies to other tasks carried out by UNPROFOR, such as the concept of safe areas and exclusion zones. In 1993, safe areas were established around Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac. The UN Secretary-General informed the Security Council that about 34,000 additional troops would be required in order to obtain deterrence through strength, with a light option of 7,500 troops as an initial approach with limited objectives based on the cooperation of the parties. The Security Council opted for this light option and then even this number took a long time to be achieved.
This gap between the lofty pronouncement of the resolutions and the realities on the ground has become a chasm in the case of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
My experience in my present assignment has convinced me, as Lord Owen has previously expressed, that the best way to bridge this gap is to link membership of the Security Council and participation in the decision making process that follows with the responsibility that ensues from having your own personnel on the ground. I believe therefore that a membership on the Security Council should oblige the members to contribute their fair part of personnel and funds to a permanent UN brigade. This would link power and responsibility in a way that will bring the members of the Security Council closer to one another. Such a reform would mark the end of sending other countries’ armies, and not your own, into UN peacekeeping operations. The UN - and world politics - will profit from such a development.
Furthermore in the case of the safe areas, the Security Council resolution did not require the Bosnian government forces to withdraw from all of them. In fact, the Headquarters of the Fifth Corps of the Bosnian government army is located in the town of Bihac and that of the Second Corps in the town of Tuzla, thereby further complicating the UN’s task of keeping these areas safe.
The developments of the last days confirm that the only effective way to make the safe areas truly safe is to define a regime acceptable to both parties and to allocate the resources required to carry out the task in a credible and effective manner.
So, in considering the success or failure of UNPROFOR we have to remember that although its mandate contains some elements of enforcement, it is largely a peacekeeping mandate.
The logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military factors that are quite different from those of enforcement. And the dynamics of enforcement are incompatible with the political process that peacekeeping is intended to facilitate. UNPROFOR is not an army sent out to fight as one side of the war. It is basically a mission deployed by the Security Council to fulfil three purposes; to alleviate the consequences of the war, first and foremost through the provision of humanitarian aid; to contain the conflict and mitigate the consequences, through the establishment of a no-fly zone, safe areas and exclusion zones; and to promote the prospects for negotiated peace agreements, through local ceasefires and other similar arrangements.
Today, we are in a situation where none of the parties seems to have reached the firm conclusion that it has a better chance of achieving its objectives at the negotiating table rather than in the battlefield. As a consequence of this, the efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution have come to a virtual standstill. UNPROFOR remains deployed with a peacekeeping force in an area where there is little peace to keep. And its mandate, which cannot be implemented without the consent of the parties, has been gradually expanded to include elements of enforcement which have increasingly led it to be seen as a party to the conflict.
This has again led to a discussion of UNPROFOR’s future. Should it withdraw? Should it be given a mandate of enforcement? Or should it continue with its present mandate? In a situation where the UN is not allowed to implement its mandate - and more and more is preoccupied with supplying and protecting itself - the troop-contributing nations will eventually ask themselves how long they have the necessary support in their public opinion and parliaments to continue their contributions. Nevertheless, as of today none of the members of the Security Council or of the troop-contributing nations favours a withdrawal, which could lead to a more intense war.
Nor is there support for the enforcement option. It would lead to casualties which - I believe - few troop-contributing nations are ready to accept. And it would lead the international community into the role of a party to the conflict with grave consequences for efforts to facilitate humanitarian assistance and a negotiated solution. However it is equally clear that we cannot accept the continuation of the status quo. That would, I fear, gradually reduce even more UNPROFOR’s ability to provide effective assistance to humanitarian and political efforts. It would bring more UN casualties, expose the peacekeeping troops to unacceptable risks and damage the UN credibility even further.
As I have already mentioned, several governments, including your own, are now deploying additional forces to the area for a Rapid Reaction Force. Its intention is to provide for more vigorous implementation of the mandate and allow for a more forceful self-defence. This deployment will hopefully improve the situation for the UN forces on the ground. And during the next days and weeks I have no doubt that the discussion will continue and that additional measures will be taken to enhance the efficiency and credibility of the peacekeeping forces.
The relationship between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement is one of the many difficult dilemmas of the conflict. But there are many others that I have experienced almost every day since taking up my function as UN Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. Allow me to mention a few of them.
I am often asked if all the humanitarian assistance does not only prolong the conflict. We are feeding the armies and not the civilians, some say. Yes, a portion of the humanitarian assistance may end up feeding soldiers. But is it avoidable? In the war in Bosnia the armed forces often consist of people who alternate between military and civilian life. It is often hard to distinguish civilians from soldiers - if not impossible. In that way. it is almost impossible to prevent humanitarian assistance from feeding soldiers as well as people who are only civilians. But I must add; humanitarian assistance has reached 4 million people in the former Yugoslavia. It has kept hundreds of thousands alive who would otherwise have died from starvation or would have joined others in the endless lines of refugees. It has prolonged the lives of a great number of innocent civilians, including children.
Let one thing be clear: peace requires cooperation and compromise from the parties. Anyone who insists on an ideal peace must expect a long war, with more destruction, more death and more suffering. I hope somebody will be studying how it was that in the search for a perfect peace so many forgot or down-played the evil of each month’s evermore ethnic cleansing, creating evermore separation. We have tried, in previous peace plans, to find solutions which would allow people irrespective of their ethnic or religious backgrounds to live together. But, each time, one or another party did not cooperate. The war has continued. And the longer it goes on the more difficult it becomes to heal the wounds. For every day of suffering and destruction the ethnic and religious lines of division become sharper That is unfortunately the reality on the ground. And any realistic peace plan has to take that reality into account.
The same applies to the question of territory. The Contact Group plan does not force the Bosnian Serbs to give up all the territory they have acquired during the war. But nor does it accept the status quo. The Bosnian Serbs today hold 70% of the territory. They are asked to accept a peace plan which will give them 49%. Again we face the critical dilemma; do we pursue an ideal peace, thereby risking a long war, or do we pursue an achievable peace, hoping we may end the war? Of course, we are not seeking peace at any cost. But nor can we accept that the endless killing of innocent civilians is allowed to continue.
Whenever we can we should and must, of course, try to make people of different national and ethnic origins live together. And we do. In Croatia a ceasefire agreement was signed on 29th March last year between the Croatian government and the authorities of the Serb-held areas of Croatia. Lines of Separation were established between the Croatian and the Serb forces. After long and intense negotiations, an Economic Agreement was signed in early December. Its aim was to establish economic links between Croatians and Serbs and gradually to help them live together again. The highway was opened between Zagreb and the border to the FRY -through Serb-held territories. Croatians and Serbs started using the same road, talking, meeting. The Croatian oil pipeline through Serb-held territory was reopened. Work was started to reopen water and electricity supplies destroyed by the war as well as railroads. Our aim was clear; to break down the barriers created by war, to normalise life and gradually to turn the military zone of separation into an economic zone of cooperation. We knew that the more people could benefit from this economic cooperation, the more we would reduce the danger of a new war. And the more would we promote a peaceful solution where Croats and Serbs would again live together and get and get on with their lives. But we also knew that not all wanted this development. We knew that we had limited time available to us. We were racing against the clock and hard-line elements. And we were thwarted. In April a number of provocations took place on the highway. It was closed again and Croatian forces moved in to take over the UN Protected Area in Western Slavonia.
I mention this as an example: wherever we can we have tried and we will try again - to enable people of different backgrounds to live together.
Today, the situation in Bosnia and in Croatia looks grim. Negotiations have come to a standstill. Nevertheless, the only alternative to a negotiated solution is more destruction and suffering, more death and more refugees. At this very moment we are making every effort to reopen negotiations - in Bosnia and in Croatia. It will not be easy. But we have no other choice than to continue our efforts.
At the same time, we must pursue a more long-term perspective: how can we in Europe prevent such conflicts from taking place in the future? I believe that we can learn a lot from our recent experience in Western Europe.
The most important achievement in Europe this century has been the creation of a zone of stability in Western Europe. The development of what is now the European Union has brought arch enemies and arch rivals together as close partners. This partnership has brought peace to a part of our continent ruined by war and conflict over and over again. It has given hundreds of millions of people economic prosperity and political stability.
Today, the challenge is to extend that area of peace and stability across the lines of division of the cold war period. It is to integrate new members in central and Eastern Europe step-by-step. In this process, the European Union will have a leading role.
Of course, when Western Europe was brought together it was a result of NATO and the European Community. Today, however, security and stability has become more a matter of political and economic integration. The European Union is the only organisation with a mandate wide enough to perform that task.
I am convinced that lasting peace in Europe can only be achieved through gradual integration of central and Eastern Europe into western institutions and organisations. We must, of course, do our utmost to solve the present conflicts. But it is just as important to prevent new conflicts from breaking out. If we do not succeed in gradually integrating the whole of Europe - economically, politically and socially - then I fear that old lines of division will be replaced by new. We can find ourselves in a Europe with stability and order in one part of the continent and instability and disorder in others. Such instability could easily spread to other parts of the continent. That must be avoided. And the major part of the burden will have to be carried by the European Union.
In this perspective I see the European Union as a crucial peacemaking and peacekeeping institution in Europe; and I see the gradual enlargement as steps towards peace and stability.
The European Union will not alone be able to secure peace and stability in Europe. But I am convinced that without the Union playing its full role the prospects of building durable stability will be slim.
Promoting stability will require that we bring together the need for close integration with the search for national, ethnic and cultural identity. Following the collapse of centralised and authoritarian states, national and ethnic groups insist on rediscovering and developing their own identities. And they must be allowed to do so. But nationalism has two faces. Any European order - and indeed the European Union - must be flexible enough to promote the peaceful pursuit of national and ethnic identities. But it must also be integrated enough to discourage the aggressive forces of nationalism. A European order which becomes too inflexible and does not sufficiently respect the multitude of ethnic and national identities will break apart. On the other hand, a European order which does not effectively discourage the aggressive pursuit of nationalistic or ethnic policies will be torn apart. That we simply cannot afford.
We must solve the conflict of the former Yugoslavia and we must solve it peacefully. But we must not believe that the rest of Europe is immune to the madness of aggressive nationalism. The struggle to fight it cannot be carried out by international organisations alone. It is a struggle for the hearts and minds of people. And it is therefore a struggle in which we are all called upon to take part.