The 21st Thomas Corbishley Memorial Lecture 1997
The Macedonian Question
A Diplomatic Initiative in the 1990s
By Robin O'Neill CMG

The 2lst Thomas Corbishley Memorial Lecture dealt with the Macedonian question. In distinction from the 20th Lecture which dealt with the broad brush consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Empire in central and eastern Europe, this year's Lecture concentrated on one particular issue arising from the liberalisation of regimes in thc Balkans. The recognition of the Republic of Macedonia, the southernmost part of the former Yugoslavia, by the member states of the European Union was impossible as long as the Greek government objected to the name of the new republic. In order to attempt to resolve this matter the presidency of the European Community (held by the United Kingdom for the second half of 1992) asked Mr Robin O'Neill to study the problem and recommend a solution.

The trustees are grateful to Mr O'Neill for the meticulous and fair presentation of the issues at stake. They hope that the exposition of this seemingly intractable problem will help towards its resolution.

George Wedell 30th January 1998

THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION

In recent years, the themes of the annual Corbishley Lectures have in a sense darkened, from looking towards a vision of the future to treating, rather, the difficulties of international life and what Ambassador Stoltenberg called in 1995, 'intractable conflicts'. This, paradoxically, at a time when the heavy threat of East-West confrontation which had hung over Europe for more than forty years has lifted - but only to be followed by the re-emergence of lesser political problems which the greater menace had long suppressed. However, in a Europe freed from the threat of catastrophic war those problems can also once again be addressed rationally, in the terms of the concern of the Wyndham Place Trust for 'peace, world order and the rule of law'; and their resolution is yet another aspect of that building of Europe in which Father Corbishley was convinced that the Churches and Christians in Europe must be involved. Nowhere in Europe has there been more need of work for reconciliation and peace-making than in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That work has taken various forms, and I feel honoured to have been asked to speak this evening about my part in attempting to ensure a peaceful and stable future for the most southerly of the Yugoslav Republics, Macedonia, in 1992.

I was, in effect, the latest person to seek to solve the Macedonian Question, which is today, just as in the nineteenth century, how to find a stable political future for that part of the southern Balkans which very roughly corresponds to the classical kingdom of Macon, of Philip and Alexander. The kingdom of Macedon was more extensive than the modern Republic of Macedonia and the Creek province of Macedonia taken together, and that is part of the problem; and whatever may have been the culture of the citizens of Macedon, successive waves of immigration by Slavs, Bulgars and Turks have made the region ethnically, culturally and religiously complex. You will recall that the Macedonian Question emerged as a preoccupation of the European Powers as the Turkish empire in Europe began to crumble in revolt and secession. In 1878, as ever since, the major Powers were not prepared to leave the matter to be solved by the peoples of the region themselves; but equally, there was little readiness on the part of those peoples to resolve things by peaceful compromise. The two Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 established very roughly the present frontiers: today's Republic of Macedonia went to Serbia, and then became first, part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and subsequently, after 1945, the Republic of Macedonia within Tito's Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

When Yugoslavia began to break up in 1991, Macedonia wanted to preserve the federal state. It was only after Slovenia, Croatia and effectively Bosnia also had broken away, and it was clear that Macedonia would be no more than the appendage to what was in effect a Serbian state, that Macedonia declared its own independence, on 18 September 1991. When however the new Republic of Macedonia sought recognition by the member states of the European Community, the government of Greece objected, on the grounds its name implied a territorial claim to part of Greece - the Greek province of Macedonia. The other members of the European Community could not ignore this strongly held view on the part of Greece, and in the first half of 1992 the government of Portugal, holding the Presidency of the EC, sought to find a solution on the basis that Macedonia would change its name to one acceptable to Greece, which of course meant dropping the word 'Macedonia'. Portugal found a possible solution, but Greece rejected it as inadequate; and the British Presidency began on 1 July 1992 with the situation in Bosnia deteriorating seriously, and a real prospect that the instability in the rest of Yugoslavia might spread south to Macedonia, with potentially very serious consequences for the whole of the southern Balkans.

That is where I came in. But the question I asked myself on 3 September 1992, when I became the Personal Representative of the British Foreign Secretary, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the European Community, charged with seeking to establish a basis for the recognition of Macedonia by the European Community and its member states, was not, "How can I solve the Macedonian Question?" but, "How on earth am I to get to Skopje?" - the capital of Macedonia. My problem was real, even though it may sound absurd. It was how to get in touch with a government whose name I could not even use. The EC, I was told, acknowledged the existence of what it called the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and indeed that it had a government. But my mission was to tell the Government of Macedonia that it must change the name of the state. To use the word Macedonia at any time might weaken my position in the negotiations; and also, and even more important, weaken my standing with the EC country which felt most strongly about the name, Macedonia, that is to say, Greece.

I solved this problem by sending a fax message simply to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Skopje - no country named, saying that I would like to pay a visit to Skopje, and I would be arriving on 23 September. Could arrangements kindly be made to book an hotel room for me? I ought to acknowledge at this point the unfailing good temper and good sense I met with in Macedonia throughout my mission, over my verbal contortions in avoiding ever using the word, Macedonia. To insist that I spoke of Macedonia in my formal dealings, and that my own approach was unacceptable would have been easy, and indeed from the formal point of view entirely justifiable. If that had been done, and the same stiffness had been shown on the Macedonian side as I was obliged to display myself, my mission might never have started at all. But I was never placed in any embarrassment over this point at any time in Macedonia.

My next problem was how, physically, to get there. In September 1992, that was not so easy as it is today. I decided for my first visit to travel by train, from Thessaloniki. In 1992, the train from Thessaloniki to Skopje, though called the Balkan Express, did not resemble the international Wagons Lits of seventy years earlier in which Lord Curzon undertook his diplomatic expeditions. It was dirty and not very comfortable, it had very few passengers, and it was at first not clear whether it was going to leave at all. It was late, and also very hot. The train stopped for two hours at the frontier, for reasons which were again not clear, but finally as the sun set we set off again through Macedonia. I began to worry whether I would know when we reached Skopje - we were certainly going to be late, and also whether I was really the right person to take on this difficult task. (I was right to worry about that. For neither I nor the whole diplomatic machine of the EC had ascertained that the time changes between Greece and Macedonia: I thought that it was one o'clock in the morning when we finally reached Skopje, not midnight. And I was also surprised to be greeted on the platform by a British television crew who, it turned out, simply happened to be visiting Skopje at the time.) On the next morning I had the first of many meetings with the then Foreign Minister, Mr Denko Maleski.

I should perhaps at this point explain exactly what my instructions were. My task, on behalf of the EC, was to create the conditions under which the members states could recognize Macedonia, "under a name which does not include the term Macedonia" - to use the words of the so-called Lisbon Declaration adopted by the Heads of Government of the EC member states on 27 June 1992. You will see at once that I had been given an unusual, difficult, and even impertinent mission. Impertinent, because under international law a state has the absolute right to call itself whatever it wishes. It is not for outsiders to say what the name of a country should be. That decision as to the name of a country ought to be respected by the rest of the international community. At the same time, a state can of course decide not to recognize another if it so chooses.

My work had to take place within the process of cooperation on foreign policy within the EC. In 1992, the EC was feeling its way slowly towards mechanisms for cooperation on foreign policy which it was hoped would lead to common action on major international issues, and even in due course to a common foreign policy. The events in former Yugoslavia in 1991 were seen as a particular challenge: if the EC could not agree on a common policy towards a neighbouring area in Europe of high political and strategic concern, what hope did it have of agreeing on common policies anywhere at all? But quarrels and disputes within a family or with your next-door neighbours are the hardest to settle, and things are much more difficult still if there is a long history of suspicion or hostility. Those factors certainly applied in the case of a number of EC states with regard to Yugoslavia and its historical predecessors. The recognition of Croatia by the member states of the EC in January 1992 demonstrated exactly that difficulty, but it also made the EC more determined to show that cooperation over policy towards the new republics of the former Yugoslavia was possible.

Common foreign policy making within the EU has three particular features. The first of these is unanimity. If one country refuses to agree to something which all the rest favour, no common decision will be reached. Second, if one country says that a matter is of very great political importance to it, the other members will respect that and give that country's views great weight. Quite right. But there is a difference both between what is of national importance and what a government may see as politically important at a particular time, and also between the interests of one country and the interests of the EU as a whole. A common policy for the EU must be concerned with the common interest of the EU and not the individual interests of the member states. If on some matter the particular interests of one state are really of overriding importance to it but also differ from the common interest, the right conclusion may well be that on this issue it is better that we each take the decision which meets our own interests. But here the third principle comes in - and it is perhaps the very first principle of politics. Decisions in the EU are taken in the real world, and they are not taken singly. They inevitably form part of a process of striking mutual bargains. I am not going to offend one country on an issue it feels strongly about, when I badly need its vote on another issue which matters very much to me. All these factors applied to the questions I was dealing with, and they determined the decisions which were finally taken on my mission.

But let us return to the morning of 23 September 1992. I had not come to Macedonia as a mediator between the EC and Macedonia, still less as a mediator between Macedonia and Greece. My task was to persuade Macedonia to change its name to something new which did not include the word Macedonia, not to suggest that the EC should change its mind. If I could secure a change of the name, I was confident that we could also solve a small number of less sensitive detailed questions relating to phrases in the Macedonian constitution to which Greece objected. I had already been to Athens before coming to Skopje in order to learn the views of the Greek government, which were of course of key importance. There I was told that Greece was ready to accept a 'dual name' solution, under which Macedonia might continue to call itself what it wished within its borders, but itself used another name, without the word Macedonia, internationally. I was told also that I could carry with me an assurance of the underlying good will of the government of Greece towards their new neighbour to the north. I had said that this was very important to me, as I would be seeking substantial concessions when I reached Skopje; and one very important practical aspect of this was the ban which had been imposed on imports of oil and petrol into Macedonia from Greece. That would not help my mission. I was also informed of the concern of Greece at the design of the national flag of Macedonia, as apparently using a design to be found on the tomb of Philip of Macedon. I promised to convey this concern to the government of Macedonia, even though it did not form part of the EC decision at Lisbon.

On 23 and 24 September, at a series of meetings in Skopje with Ministers, and also with the President, I explained that my mission was to make the recognition of Macedonia by the EC possible. The message from Lisbon was positive. The members of the EC wanted to recognize Macedonia and to collaborate constructively with it. But that meant finding a name for the Republic acceptable to all. I could not argue that I had any legal right to insist on this; but in terms of political real life, Macedonia needed general international recognition to give it security and stability, and incidentally help from the EC. It needed also to establish the basis for permanent good-neighbourly relations with Greece. For whatever else happened, Greece and Macedonia were bound by the facts of geography to be next-door neighbours for ever. We had only limited time, and I must report to the EC Presidency on the success or failure of my mission by the beginning of December.

The reply I received to this was that the name Macedonia expressed the national identity of the state and of all the ethnic groups which made it up. The name was part of the constitution, which had been approved by the people of Macedonia. It had been confirmed in Parliament by all the political parties, including those representing the non-Slav citizens of Macedonia. The name Macedonia defined the state specifically, but without expressing any wider territorial claim, and it helped to express a national identity for all the ethnic groups which made it up. As the Foreign Minister put it to me in one of our conversations, "We may not have been in this region as long as the Greeks, but we have been here since the sixth century; and if we are not Macedonians, what are we?"

This first visit also brought home to me the almost unprecedented problems which Macedonia had had to face in establishing its place as an independent state in an unstable and troubled part of Europe. I had been told before I reached Skopje that Macedonia nurtured aggressive and expansionist ambitions against the territory of one of its neighbours. I found that claim hard to reconcile with the reality of a small, desperately poor state which itself felt threatened from the north, and which had only a tiny army with no modern or heavy equipment at all.

I had said on this first visit I did not want to talk about what new name Macedonia might adopt, but I would return in a week, when both of us had been able to reflect on these first talks. I returned to Skopje on 6 October, this time by road. My impressions of that journey are even more vivid than those of arriving by rail. The Macedonian government had agreed to meet me at the Greek frontier with a car, since it appeared to be impossible for a Greek car to drive into Macedonia. I made all my subsequent journeys to Macedonia that way, and they gave me the feeling each time of being in one of those old Hollywood films about the Cold War and crossing points in Berlin. My car from Thessaloniki would bring me to the customs post at Gevgelija: empty, deserted. At the far side, there would be a black car from the Foreign Ministry. My luggage was moved from one car to the other, and we set off - on this first occasion, for Skopje. The real impact of the blockade by Greece on oil deliveries to Macedonia then came home to me. On that first drive to Skopje, we passed only three other cars on the whole journey of 700 miles. Many donkeys, some oxen, people walking, and a surprising number of large oil tankers which appeared to be driving straight through Macedonia into Serbia from Greece; but only three cars. And in Skopje, empty streets and long queues of stationary cars around every petrol station. It was a strange experience in modern Europe.

On this second visit we discussed, inevitably, what was in effect an economic blockade of Macedonia by Greece, arising in part from confusion over EC licensing regulations, and what the EC should be doing to bring this unjustifiable action to an end. But we talked principally once again about the name of Macedonia. I said that it was not for me to say what the name of the Republic should be. That was the business of the government and people of Macedonia. I described however a number of alternatives which had been put to me in Athens. Some of these, 'The New Slav Republic', for example, seemed to me to be dangerous, in that they might provoke or encourage territorial claims by other countries which could threaten the survival of Macedonia; but I had nevertheless to put them to the government of Macedonia. We spent many hours then and later just talking; for it was only through trying out on one another a wide range of ideas that we could hope to understand fully the position and the difficulties of the other side and perhaps identify ways of reaching agreement. My conclusion at the end of these talks was that, despite ail my arguments, it was not politically possible for the government of Macedonia to propose a new substantive name which did not retain the word, Macedonia. The Macedonian Parliament would not approve it. A name which made it clear that Macedonia had no claims to the wider historical region of Macedonia, such as 'Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)', might be possible. Another possible solution was for the EC to recognize Macedonia as 'the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'. I did not myself like that. It still left the real name of Macedonia up in the air, perhaps for a long time; and I was not certain that it would lead to recognition of Macedonia by Greece. It might nevertheless open the door to EC recognition and to membership of the United Nations. It was a possible fall- back solution.

I went back to Athens on 12 October, to discuss my two visits to Skopje. The Greek government repeated that the Declaration of the EC Heads of Government at Lisbon, with its dropping of the name Macedonia, was for them, and I quote from my report at the time, "the last word on the question of Macedonian recognition". I noted this, but I felt bound to warn the Greek government that if in the event Macedonia did secure recognition by the EC and entry into the United Nations without having changed its name permanently, the chance for securing a new name for Macedonia acceptable to Greece might have been lost for ever. In diplomacy, opportunities can slip away; and I also said frankly that the economic pressure Greece was putting on Macedonia would in my view harm my chances of securing what Greece wanted, not advance them.

But the action really moves now to London, which President Gligorov visited on 14 to 16 October. He discussed with the British Foreign Secretary, Mr Douglas Hurd, the serious harm which EC trade regulations ostensibly directed to enforcing sanctions against Serbia were in practice causing to Macedonia, and also the question of EC recognition and the name under which this would take place. On the next day I followed up that conversation with the President in my capacity not as a British official, but as the representative of the Presidency. (That distinction was in fact very important for me. It gave me independence from the foreign policy concerns of any single government, including those of the British government; but of course it equally meant that I had to take account of the concerns of all twelve EC members.)

As we talked, I recalled that Britain itself has a very similar problem with a neighbour. In some ways, a more serious problem than Greece or Macedonia faced. The Republic of Ireland claims part of the territory of the United Kingdom. The Irish constitution states that the state of Ireland is the whole of the island of Ireland. The Republic of Ireland has always refused to amend that article of its constitution. The British Government, however, have no doubt that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom. But many years ago a common sense way was found of continuing to do business together. It has two parts. First, all international treaties between Britain and Ireland exist in two separate forms. The Irish copy of the treaty says that it is between Ireland and the United Kingdom, and it is signed on behalf of Ireland. The other copy, the British one, says it is between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and is signed in the full name of the United Kingdom. The second part of this understanding is that we each accept at all other times the name which the other wants to use. In other words, Ireland never objects in international organisations, or for example in British passports to our use of the term 'United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland', and we do not object to Ireland calling itself Ireland.

I asked the President whether this might not perhaps offer a possible solution to our common problem. Macedonia would accept in certain formal dealings, certainly with Greece, the use of a name other than that of the Republic of Macedonia; but its own use of that name for all other purposes would never be opposed. The President replied that he would have no objection in principle to an understanding on such lines with Greece bilaterally - the understanding between Britain and Ireland was bilateral; but would the same be expected to apply with all EC states? I said it would; but this special name would only be used for certain formal international purposes. We agreed that a solution of the 'Irish' kind was only possible where there was underlying trust and goodwill between the two countries concerned, but we would both give it further thought. There were now therefore three possibilities on the table: a new name without the word Macedonia, which Greece wanted; 'Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)', which President Gligorov was prepared to offer; and some kind of dual name, perhaps on 'Irish' lines, where each party accepted what the other called itself, but also itself used the name which it preferred.

I visited Athens again on my way back to Macedonia in early November. I received a cold response on the use of two names on the lines of the Irish model, with the EC possibly recognizing Macedonia under the name of the 'former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'. The importance to Macedonia of establishing a good permanent relationship with Greece was once again urged on me.

Back in Macedonia on 5 November, this time at Ohrid, the lake-side former capital of the Emperor Samuel, in the tenth century, in the south-western corner of Macedonia, I strongly urged the Macedonian government now to take the initiative itself, and to decide on and announce within the next few weeks a new name for the Republic, not as a conditional response to what might come out of the European Council meeting which was to take place in Edinburgh in December, but as an autonomous decision. If there was not the substance for real progress at Edinburgh, I feared that the outcome, which would be unwelcome to Macedonia, would be a reconfirmation of the Lisbon Declaration. A possible alternative would be for the EC member states to declare that they recognised the 'former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' under that name, but that they also accepted that for all purposes other than dealing with the EC and its members Macedonia should use its own chosen name, which would thereby be preserved. But this did not meet the terms of the Lisbon Declaration, and I did not think it would be acceptable to Greece, particularly if the word Macedonia was retained. It was nevertheless the only equitable solu6on making use of dual names I had been able to identify.

President Gligorov told me in reply that he agreed that a permanent solution was needed which would settle relations with Greece. He wished to contribute to stability in the Balkans. If Macedonia could achieve international acceptance within its present borders that would be a stabilising factor in the region and could at last solve the long-standing Macedonian question. The cause of extreme nationalism throughout the Balkans would encounter a reverse. But any solution must both take account of the historical problem of the Macedonian nation and also respect the concerns of Macedonia's neighbours. (Again, I am quoting here from my report at the time.) He said that his own preference would be for Greece to call Macedonia by any name it wished, whilst all other EC states recognized the Republic of Macedonia as such. He therefore favoured in principle a simple, direct solution; but he would look again at the 'dual name' compromise.

I spent the following days visiting most EC capitals to explain the progress I had made, and how I thought the question of securing a decision on the. recognition of Macedonia - which I naturally hoped would be a positive decision based on proposals which both Greece and Macedonia could accept, might be handled. From 18 to 20 November I paid a final visit to Skopje. The President informed me that he had concluded against a definitive change of the name of the Republic. That would not be acceptable to Parliament. The government were nevertheless ready to agree, in return for agreement on the part of all twelve EC member states at Edinburgh to recognize Macedonia, to adopt the name 'Republic of Macedonia (Skopje)' for all international purposes: all international purposes, not just for relations with the EC. The legal name of the Republic of Macedonia would not however be changed. This would provide 'dual names'. An 'Irish' style solution, under which Macedonia could call itself what it wished, but would agree to be called the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by those EC states which so wished was artificial and, more seriously, could well become semi-permanent. Like the Cyprus problem it could still be with us in twenty years, or even longer. He could not accept it.

I said that in that event I would not include it in my report; and we therefore abandoned an 'Irish' style solution by the EC as a whole. I said I would record the readiness of the government of Macedonia to adopt the international name of Republic of Macedonia (Skopje); but I must say at once that it fell short of the Lisbon Declaration, because it retained the word Macedonia. I could not say whether Greece would regard this as a sufficient concession, nor whether the other eleven EC states would consider it to be a reasonable offer.

That was the end of my travelling to Skopje, but on 23 November I went to Vienna to see the Greek Foreign Minister, Mr Papaconstantinou, who was there for a conference, over breakfast; and then went on to Athens. I wished to inform the Greek government directly of the outcome of my negotiations. In Vienna, the Foreign Minister assured me that Greece very much wanted Macedonia to survive - though he was of course careful, as in all our conversations, never to use that word. Greece had no interest in working for a Greater Albania, Greater Bulgaria or Greater Serbia. But the Greek government faced a very serious political problem over the name. 'Skopje' could call itself anything it wished, providing the word Macedonia was omitted. If it was there, he was afraid we faced deadlock. I described very fully what Macedonia had offered. There was a limit to what any government could do in a democracy, where Parliament had the last word, and I had had to conclude that I had reached that limit. I drew the attention of Mr Papaconstantinou to the problems which Macedonia faced, and which could endanger the stability of the whole region if full recognition of Macedonia was not secured; and also to the chance for Greece which Macedonia's offer to adopt a new name provided. If that offer was not taken up at Edinburgh, I believed it would not reoccur, and Greece would find that the international community came in time to recognize the Republic of Macedonia as just that.

In Athens the Prime Minister, Mr Mitsotakis saw me, for the first time. He told me that he was determined to settle the problem, but he had no margin for manoeuvre on the name. This must exclude the word Macedonia. That was a political fact. He was ready to meet President Gligorov in any third country, and he had already ordered the release of all the oil blocked at Thessaloniki. If Macedonia changed its name acceptably, "we can finish in a very happy way". I replied that what would really make an impact in Macedonia would be to get the oil into railway trucks and over the frontier. I agreed with Mr Mitsotakis that there had been no fundamental change on the Macedonian side - or indeed on the Greek side over the past six months; but the international situation had become worse and was now more dangerous. The Prime Minister's officials described to me separately what they called a goodwill package by Greece. If 'Skopje' abandoned the name Macedonia the blocked oil would be released, Greece would offer generous economic aid, and would help 'Skopje' in all its international relations. The alternative, however, would be "very bad" for 'Skopje'. I promised to see that this offer was well understood in Skopje, but I repeated that the best immediate signal would be to get the blocked oil actually flowing across the frontier.

We are now almost at the end of my story. I delivered my report to Mr Hurd on 1 December, and he sent it on to all the other EC governments. It recorded the agreement of the government of Macedonia to change its name to 'Macedonia (Skopje)' "for all international purposes" if the European Council agreed at Edinburgh to recognize the Republic under that name. I also described very briefly the situation in Macedonia and the surrounding region since the beginning of the British Presidency. It had deteriorated; and the unrecognised status of Macedonia and the economic pressures placed on it had in my view led to its becoming less stable. My final paragraph had however to state clearly: "This offer (made by Macedonia] does not correspond to the positive offer expressed in the European Council Declaration at Lisbon, of readiness to recognize FYROM [i.e. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] under a name which does not include the term Macedonia. The European Council will wish to consider how to proceed:"

President Gligorov visited London on 3 December, and discussed with Mr Major the way forward at Edinburgh. The EC Council of Foreign Ministers discussed my report on 7 December. At that meeting several Foreign Ministers spoke of the need to find an early solution, but the Greek Foreign Minister denounced my report: my impartiality, my judgement and my methods of work. He criticised the fact that I had dealt in Skopje only with the Macedonian government, and had not talked to the opposition. I found that last charge unfair; for Greece had insisted that I should not be a mediator, but must work exclusively to persuade the Macedonian government to meet the terms of the Lisbon Declaration. The only way to do that was by negotiating with the Government. But I took comfort from the fact that the Greek government had, incidentally, criticised and dismissed in almost identical terms a few months earlier, a legal Opinion by an EC Arbitration Commission headed by a very distinguished French international lawyer, Monsieur Robert Badinter, to the effect that Macedonia met all the criteria for international recognition.

The matter therefore went forward to the European Council with no real prospect of agreement. That meeting had to deal with a number of very difficult internal Community issues; and there was no hope of reaching agreement there on recognition of Macedonia by all EC members on the basis Macedonia had offered. Moreover, Greece had a veto, and would have used it if the matter had been pressed to a vote. The meeting at Edinburgh ended simply with the European Council putting on one side the question of recognition of Macedonia, because of the insistence of Greece that the name 'Macedonia' could not be used. The Council decided instead to concentrate on practical measures such as economic assistance, and to give substantial economic help to Macedonia. My mission had failed.

Why? A number of questions may have occurred to you in the course of this historical account, concerning not the details of what happened, but why it happened. The first question, which I had in mind throughout my work was what was the real aim of the Greek government, for that of course was crucial to the policy of the EC, and the prospects for any successful outcome. The common position of the EC after the Lisbon meeting was extremely favourable to Greece. It went very close to saying that the member states would not recognize Macedonia until it stopped calling itself Macedonia and took another name. Such a change was something which Greece could never have hoped to achieve on its own. In addition, the Greek government had very strong domestic political reasons for wanting to see the name Macedonia disappear. That would have been a triumph for the Mitsotakis government, which had embarked on a very large populist campaign to whip up nationalist sentiment on the issue.

But was that the whole story? There remained certain elements in the policy of Greece which I found it hard to reconcile. The Greek Foreign Minister had assured me that he very much wanted to see 'Skopje' survive; and that was indeed very much in the interests of Greece. If the instability and violence in the rest of former Yugoslavia had spread into Macedonia, Greece would have been faced with all the problems of armed conflict just across its borders - and without doubt, and quite properly, would have called for joint action both by NATO and by the EC. The Greek government made much to its EC partners of the threat from a greater Bulgaria which would in time absorb Macedonia. Fast history makes that fear understandable. But surely a weak Macedonia was more likely to fail victim to Bulgaria than a successful and stable Macedonia? Bulgaria was in fact one of the very first states to recognize Macedonia, and in 1992 behaved irreproachably towards Macedonia; but I believe that the old, historic fear and suspicion of Greece regarding a Greater Bulgaria with ambitions to secure a port on the Mediterranean, was an important but unavowed part of the problem.

And the Greek oil blockade, for example, did not appear to be part of a negotiating tactic in securing the Lisbon Declaration objectives. It seemed much more designed to bring Macedonia to its knees. It was beyond question unhelpful to my negotiations, as I told the Greek government, when the aim of those negotiations was to secure what Greece wanted. Again, the introduction of the issue of the Macedonian flag made fulfilling the EC mandate more difficult. I do not question the strength of popular feeling aroused in Greece by that, to an outsider, rather arcane iconographical issue; but my final impression was that whenever I made some progress on a point which I had been told was important a further, new requirement was brought forward.

There were certainly some people in the region in 1992, and I believe that some of them were in Greece, who would have been happy if the new, small Republic of Macedonia had not survived - perhaps through being absorbed into one of its neighbours. Macedonia would have simply disappeared. The Macedonian question would have been solved, though of course in a very different way from my own daydream at times, of 6eing the man who at last had found the solution. (In reality, of course, no such tidy eradication of Macedonia from the map of Europe would have happened. On the contrary, one of the old flash-points of the Balkans would have been reignited, with tragic consequences spreading beyond the boundaries of that country.)

I have said that my mission, which was very simply to get the Lisbon Declaration implemented, had failed. But in a wider sense, was it all failure? The EC had been made aware of the consequences for Macedonia of the Greek blockade and EC sanctions against Serbia, and also of the importance for the stability of the region of recognition of Macedonia. The unreal nature of the Lisbon Declaration had been demonstrated. Very soon after the Edinburgh meeting the EC in practice moved beyond it. Within four months Macedonia had become a member of the United Nations. Eleven of the twelve member states of the EC had recognized Macedonia, under a name incorporating that word, albeit in the unsatisfactory form of 'The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'. The door was open for EC economic assistance. Macedonia took its full place in the world community. Mr Cyrus Vance took up the task, under United Nations auspices, of solving the problems between Greece and Macedonia, this time as an acknowledged mediator; and, after a difficult period including another lengthy frontier blockade by Greece, an Interim Accord for the establishment of relations between Macedonia and Greece was reached in 1995, though without solving the problem of Macedonia's name. Macedonia has become a member of more and more international organisations, and the EC has after many hesitations at last concluded a trade and economic Cooperation Agreement with Macedonia.

But more needs to be done, to ensure stability in the region. First, the continuing use of the term 'former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia' suggests that Macedonia's existence is still in some way provisional or uncertain. It hints back at the past. Second, this problem of the name of the state will become harder to solve the longer it is left unsolved. You do not have to look farther than Cyprus to see an example of that. It must be solved; but its nature has changed, and I believe it is less difficult than it was. I was told in 1992 that Macedonia had expansionist ambitions against its neighbours, or at least against the minds of their citizens. It posed a threat, and the causes of this threat must be removed. The last five years have shown that fear to be quite unfounded. The existence of the Republic of Macedonia under that name has not destabilised its neighbours. It has demonstrated that it is no threat to them. I believe that this is now understood in Greece.

I fear that I may have confused you with my account of our discussions of an 'Irish' style solution to the question of the name of the Republic, under which a country might both itself decline to acknowledge formally the name 'Republic of Macedonia', but nevertheless accept that that was what Macedonia called itself, and how it was generally known. I continue to believe that, with good will, a solution on something like those lines could be found to a problem which I understand very well remains sensitive for Greece. It could offer an honourable way - honourable to both sides - of implementing the commitment of both parties in the Interim Accord between Greece and Macedonia of 1995 to continue to seek a resolution to their difference over Macedonia's name. The United Nations, through Mr Vance, remains ready to help in this; but I believe that, even though only the two countries directly concerned can find the solution, there is also still a part for the European Union to play, in emphasising to both of them the wider interest of Europe as a whole in removing the Macedonian Question from history's list of unresolved problems.

I have tried to give you this evening an account of what an attempt at mediation between two countries instinctively suspicious of one another and with apparently incompatible aims was like, and what it felt like. If it has left you incidentally with the impression that such efforts are at times confusing, frustrating and tedious, that is part of the truth. But patience and a belief in the potential triumph of reason have always been the key elements of diplomacy. Earlier in this century diplomacy was given a bad name, by politicians, soldiers, academics and journalists, all of whom for their different reasons would like the world to be simpler than in truth it is. In the Europe of the end of the twentieth century which still has problems to solve, but has renounced at last, we may hope for good, the illusory vision of war as offering an alternative and faster answer to international problems, there is a renewed and continuing place for diplomacy. But diplomacy requires as a prerequisite, statesmanship: the readiness to see that peace and stability are prizes well worth the cost of compromises on lesser issues.

Top

Back to Lecture menu